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How Can Brains in Vats Experience a Spatial World?  
A Puzzle for Internalists  
 
Adam Pautz 
 
 
A “tricked” brain in a vat with exactly the brain activation that I now 
have would have the same experiences that I am having now despite 
lacking a body.  — Ned Block (2012) 
 
Internalist theories of experience hold that the character of an individual’s 
experiences is entirely fixed by his intrinsic properties, so that any intrinsic 
duplicate (even a “brain in a vat”) must have exactly the same experiences. 
Proponents include Block, Chalmers, Horgan, Kriegel, McLaughlin, 
Mendelovici, Papineau, and many others. Neuroscientists also typically favor 
internalism, for instance Koch, Zeki, and Lamme. One version is type-type 
identity theory: every distinct experiential property is necessarily identical with 
a distinct intrinsic neuro-computational property of the brain. On the other side 
are various externalist theories of experience. Examples include tracking 
representationalism (Dretske, Tye), naïve realism (Campbell, Martin), and 
active externalism (Noë, O’Regan).  
I think that there is a strong empirical case to be made for internalism about 
experience and against externalist rivals. However, here my primary aim is not 
to argue for internalism but to develop an overlooked puzzle for it, a puzzle 
about the experience of space. My focus throughout will be on the type-type 
identity theory (“identity theory” for short), which is defended by Block 
(2009), McLaughlin (2003), Papineau (2014), and others. I focus on the 
identity theory because it is simple and because there has been some renewed 
interest in it. I also will suggest an answer to the puzzle, an answer having 
important consequences for our understanding of mental representation and of 
the place of the mind in the physical world.  
Let me give you a sense of the puzzle. Suppose you have an experience 
that is in fact caused by a round tomato on an all-white background. I think 
that this experience is necessarily an experience as of a round item of some 
sort. In the terminology of Chalmers (2004), it necessarily involves 
“phenomenally representing” roundness. Now the puzzle is that identity 
theorists must apparently say that this representational relation is irreducible. 
To see this, consider a lifelong, lone brain in a vat (“BIV”) that formed by 
chance and that happens to undergo the same brain state as you. On the identity 
theory, BIV has the very same tomato-like experience as you, and so also 
“phenomenally represents” roundness, despite its degenerate situation. In fact, 
given the identity theory, BIV might have all your rich visual experiences, 
representing a range of spatial properties and relations, such as moving to the 
left, having so-and-so orientation, and being above. In that sense, BIV could 
ostensibly “experience a rich spatial world”. It is “tricked” because there aren’t 
things before it with these properties. Now, obviously, these clusters of 
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properties are also not instantiated inside the brain by the neural states 
responsible for experience. The puzzle now is roughly this. How can 
experience be internally-determined and yet necessarily externally-directed? 
How can BIV represent properties that are instantiated “outside the head” (if 
they are instantiated at all), just on the basis of states “inside the head”? 
Evidently, BIV bears no interesting physical-functional relations to such 
spatial properties, including the relations invoked in our most sophisticated 
naturalistic theories of representation (asymmetric dependence, indication, and 
so on). So if, like you, BIV phenomenally represents such properties, then it 
appears that the phenomenal representation relation must be an irreducible 
relation. But this appears mysterious.1  
In response to the puzzle, I think internalists should simply concede the 
irreducibility of the phenomenal representation relation. I think internalists 
who also subscribe to the doctrine of physicalism should accept what I will call 
the “internal grounding view” of phenomenal representation. On this view, 
even though the phenomenal representation relation is irreducible, our bearing 
this relation to certain shapes and other properties is always “grounded in” (in 
the sense of Fine, Rosen, and others) our being in certain brain states. I think 
that this is a defensible view. In fact, it meshes nicely with a general view of 
representation relations that Paul Horwich and Stephen Schiffer have proposed 
on independent grounds.   
My plan is as follows. In §1, I will explain why we should take internalism 
seriously. In §§2-5, I argue that internalism leads to anti-reductionism about 
phenomenal representation. Finally, in §6, I describe the “internal grounding 
view” of phenomenal representation.  
 
1. Why Take Internalism about Experience Seriously?   
 
You will not be very interested in my puzzle for internalism if you are 
convinced that internalism about experience has no chance of being true. So I 
will first discuss the internalism-externalism debate and explain why I think 
that internalism deserves to be taken seriously. I will first explain what I 
consider to be the strongest argument for the rival position of externalism 
about experience. Then I will show that there is a stronger empirical case to be 
made for internalism, and explain why the argument for externalism is not 
decisive.  
The most discussed argument for externalism about experience and against 
internalism depends on the controversial “transparency thesis”: that whenever 
you know what your experience is like (even in hallucination), it is by 
attending to the objects and properties presented in the experience. I think that 
non-veridical experiences create problems for this thesis (Pautz 2007; see Tye 
2014 for a response). I would like to sketch what I consider to be a stronger 
argument for externalism about experience, one with a more modest starting 
point. The argument is that externalists can provide the best explanation of the 
experience of space. I call it the spatial argument. It will help set the stage for 
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the rest of the essay. In effect, my puzzle for internalists will be about how 
they might answer this argument.   
First, some terminology. Suppose again you see a tomato on a white 
background. Now pretend that later neuroscientists artificially reproduce 
exactly the same neural state you now have, so that you have a hallucination 
that perfectly matches your original experience. Intuitively, you have the same 
salient mental property in each case. Let ‘R’ rigidly designate this property. 
Philosophers would call it the property of having an experience with specific 
phenomenal character K. This is an example of what I will call an experience 
property. Now internalism about experience implies that an individual’s 
having R is entirely fixed by the intrinsic properties of his brain, so that even a 
life-long brain-in-a-vat could have R. Could this be right?  
The spatial argument against this internalist view starts with a simple 
observation. Roughly, you couldn’t have R, and fail to have an experience as 
of a round item of some sort. R is necessarily directed at a round item, a kind 
of item that needn’t exist in your brain when you have R. Call this External 
Directedness. Many philosophers have argued for the point. I will have much 
more to say about it later because it figures in my puzzle for internalists about 
the brain-in-the-vat. For now, let’s just assume it. I will also assume that 
having an experience as of a round item is a representational property in some 
good sense: you can have an experience as of a round item, even if there is no 
existing round item there. So I will put “External Directedness” by saying that 
having R necessarily involves “phenomenally representing” roundness.2  
The next step in the spatial argument against internalism concerns the 
following question: assuming the physicalist view that the physical facts fix all 
the facts, what is the physical basis of your phenomenally representing 
roundness? For instance, how can you have an experience of a round thing 
even in hallucination, when there is no physical (or mental) round thing 
around?   
Internalists about R are committed to the following answer: that your 
intrinsic physical state, considered in isolation from your environment, 
necessitates your phenomenally representing roundness, a property that is not 
instantiated by that physical state. For they claim that some intrinsic physical 
state of you necessitates your having tomato-like experience R. And, given 
“External Directedness”, this in turn necessitates your phenomenally 
representing roundness.  
However, as I indicated in the introduction, this internalist view of the 
built-in spatial intentionality of visual experience faces an apparent puzzle, 
which will be the main subject of this paper. In short, the puzzle is that 
internalism apparently requires “irreducible representational relations”. In 
addition, it apparently requires somewhat arbitrary modal connections. For 
why should simply undergoing a mere neural pattern necessarily result in 
phenomenally representing roundness and not some other shape, even in 
possible cases (like the BIV case) in which the brain state is not causally 
connected to round objects? Considering the intrinsic character of the neural 
pattern alone, this looks arbitrary.  
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The best argument for externalism about the experience property R, I think, 
is that it follows from an apparently better externalist account of the spatial 
intentionality inherent in R, one avoiding these puzzles. Since Galileo there has 
been a question about whether colors-as-we-see-them are really are “out 
there”. But, when it comes to the spatial properties and relations we 
phenomenally represent in experience, nearly everyone accepts realism: these 
really are occasionally instantiated out there in the world. (We will soon see 
that David Chalmers is an exception.) So an externalist account of how we 
represent these properties is natural: we phenomenally represent these spatial 
properties by having a visual system that interacts with instances of these very 
properties in the external world.  
One simple version is the “tracking” account of Dretske (1995) and Tye 
(1995). Very roughly, on this account, the physical ground of your 
representing roundness (and not some other shape) isn’t just your undergoing a 
certain neural pattern alone (as on internalism), but your undergoing a neural 
pattern that in normal conditions is caused by the presence of a round object 
(and that in turn causes behavior appropriate to such an object). For short, the 
ground is your tracking roundness. Call this a tracking property.  
This externalist view of spatial experience apparently avoids the kind of 
puzzle facing the internalist view. It runs no risk of requiring irreducible 
representational relations: on this view the phenomenal representation relation 
that links the mind to external spatial properties is just an non-mysterious 
“tracking” relation. The externalist view also minimizes arbitrariness. On this 
view, the physical basis of phenomenally representing roundness is not merely 
undergoing a neural pattern, but rather undergoing a neural pattern that tracks 
the instantiation of that very property, roundness. By extending the physical 
substrate beyond the brain, we obtain an explanation of why you have an 
experience of one shape rather than another.  
Now we can complete the spatial argument for externalism about R. The 
starting point was the modest claim that having tomato-like experience R 
necessarily involves phenomenally representing roundness. The next step was 
that phenomenally representing roundness depends on more than your intrinsic 
state: it depends on tracking round things. It follows that having experience 
property R depends on more than your intrinsic state, just as externalists 
maintain. For instance, contrary to internalism, this approach entails that an 
isolated, life-long brain-in-vat simply could not have R, even if it is an intrinsic 
duplicate of your brain, because it doesn’t suitably track round things (more on 
this in §5).  
The spatial argument is general. The character of visual experience is 
inseparable from representing spatial properties, like moving to the left, having 
so-and-so orientation, and being above. And in general (so the argument goes) 
we must explain the representation of such spatial properties in terms of links 
with the instantiation of these very properties in the external world, rather than 
in terms of mere internal neural patterns considered in isolation from that 
world. So visual experience properties are not intrinsic.  
		 5	
So far I have focused on the experience of spatial properties, examples of 
traditional “primary qualities”. But what about the experience of traditional 
“secondary qualities”?  
For instance, intuitively, having tomato-like experience R necessarily 
involves having an experience as of a certain distinctive quality along with 
roundness. I will call it sensible redness. (I will call it “sensible redness”, 
rather than just “redness”, to remain neutral between the view is that it is 
identical with “the color red” and the rival view that we should rather think of 
it as a “color-appearance property” that corresponds with but is not identical 
with the color red.) As Berkeley (1713, 157-8) noted, in general, sensible 
colors and shapes “appear as being in the same place” (though he himself 
located them both “in the mind”). Other examples of sensible properties are 
qualities of sound, bodily pain and pleasure, heat and cold, taste, and so on. We 
undeniably seem to experience sensible properties as co-instantiated with 
spatial properties, such as location and shape. Indeed, this is even so in 
hallucination. How is that possible?  
I think that those who accept an externalist account of the experience of 
“primary qualities” like shapes might use a generalization argument to support 
a similar externalist account of the experience of “secondary qualities”. So the 
spatial argument indirectly supports externalism generally. This generalization 
move is supported by considerations of uniformity. On the resulting view, 
sensible redness, like roundness, is an objective, mind-independent feature of 
tomatoes and other objects that is tracked by the visual system. In one natural 
version, it is a reflectance property of objects. Further, we phenomenally 
represent sensible redness (have experiences of it) in the same way we 
represent roundness, namely, by having a brain state that tracks it under 
biologically normal conditions.3 This theory explains how, even in 
hallucination, we can ostensibly experience sensible colors in various locations 
and as conjoined with other spatial properties. Unless we are willing to accept 
sense data in a private mental space, or the mysterious “visual field regions” of 
Peacocke (2008), how else might we explain this? True, there are traditional 
arguments against the view that sensible colors are objective properties of 
external objects, concerning perceptual variation, spectrum inversion, and so 
on. But externalists (Dretske, Tye, others) have tried to answer those 
arguments.  
The spatial argument and the generalization argument together suggest that 
experience properties like R are necessarily connected with tracking properties. 
If this is right, it is natural to go further and claim that they are just identical 
with tracking properties. So, for instance, having the tomato-like visual 
experience R just is having some or other “suitable” internal state that would, 
under biologically normal conditions, track the co-instantiation of roundness 
together with a certain sensible color (identified with a reflectance property of 
surfaces) in a certain viewer-relative place p. In general, different experiences 
(auditory experience, bodily sensations, taste experiences) involve tracking, 
and thereby representing, different clusters of external properties.  
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Thus, we have arrived at a general externalist view of experience. In fact, 
we have arrived at the “tracking representationalism” of Dretske (1995) and 
Tye (1995). It is “representationalist” in that it holds that phenomenal 
differences among individuals’ experiences reside in differences in what 
perceptible properties those individuals phenomenally represent. True, there 
are difficult cases for tracking representationalism (blur, affective differences, 
attentional differences, itches and tickles), but proponents hope that all, or 
nearly all, aspects of experience can be handled in this way. For reasons, I 
won’t go into here, I consider it to be the best form of externalism. 
Tracking representationalism is radically externalist. To see this, it may be 
helpful to compare it with an internalist theory of experience. Consider, for 
instance, the brain-based identity theory. To a first approximation, on the 
identity theory, each experience property is necessarily identical with a unique 
internal neuro-computational property (e. g. a unique spatio-temporal pattern 
of neuronal firing), rather than with a tracking property involving the external 
world. (I will provide a more complete formulation in §2.) Differences among 
experiences are constituted by differences in these patterns (see Prinz 2012, 
126-133 for a very important discussion). If you want to know the complete 
essence of having a reddish experience, you would have to look at the 
corresponding spatio-temporal neural pattern. True, a reflectance property of 
external objects normally causes this neural pattern; but the experience has no 
essential connection to that reflectance property. Likewise, the essence of the 
smell of peppermint is another (and presumably radically different) internal 
spatio-temporal neural pattern. By contrast, on the tracking representationalism 
of Dretske and Tye, experience properties are identical with tracking properties 
of the form: having some appropriate internal state or other that tracks cluster 
of spatial and other external properties P, Q, R, . . . Differences between 
experiences (within a species or across species) reside wholly in differences in 
the external physical properties normally tracked, and thereby represented, by 
those experiences. So if you want to know the essence of a reddish experience 
of a tomato, look at the reflectance property that it tracks (constituting the 
“sensible redness” you perceive, on this view) – not the neural “content 
vehicle”. And if you want to know the essence of a smell experience, look at 
the chemical property that it tracks. As Tye says: 
 
Peer as long as you like at the detailed functioning of the brain . 
. . that is not where phenomenal character is to be found (Tye 
1995, 162-3) . . . phenomenal character is in the world (Tye 
2009, 119). 
 
So far, I have sketched a seductive “spatial argument” for externalism 
about experience, which led us to the “tracking representationalism” of Dretske 
and Tye. Let us now turn to the argument for the other side, internalism about 
experience.  
There are many arguments against externalist views like tracking 
representationalism and for internalism about experience. Many of them are 
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armchair arguments. In my view, such arguments are unconvincing (Pautz 
2013b). For instance, the inverted spectrum argument says that it is 
conceivable, and therefore possible, that two people should have “inverted 
color experiences” but normally track the same reflectance properties in the 
external world (Block and Fodor 1972, Shoemaker 1994). But the move from 
conceivability to possibility is questionable (Tye 2000, 109-110). Block’s 
(1994) well-known inverted earth argument – which is the flipside of the 
inverted spectrum argument – can be shown to depend crucially on the 
assumption of internalism about experience (Levine 2001, 113). In his 
formulation of the argument, Block asserts without argument that “we can 
assume the supervenience of qualia on the brain” (1994, 518). But this is 
exactly what is at issue. We need an argument for this assumption.   
In my view, the best argument against externalism and for internalism is an 
empirical argument, which I call internal-dependence argument. I 
recommend that internalists add this argument to their arsenal. To illustrate the 
“internal-dependence” argument, I will focus on the identity theory, but I think 
a similar argument could be developed for other internalist theories. Elsewhere 
I have explained the argument in detail, and have distinguished it from more 
standard arguments.4 Here I can only briefly describe some of the recent 
empirical work it is based on. Much of this work uses the emerging technique 
of “multivariate pattern analysis”. While the spatial argument for externalism 
starts with our experience of spatial properties (traditional “primary qualities”), 
the internal-dependence for internalism starts with the experience of sensible 
properties (“secondary qualities”).  
For instance, suppose you successively experience blue, purple and green. 
Then your first color experience is more like your second than your third. 
Now, on tracking representationalism, all facts about the character of our 
experiences derive from fact about the physical properties tracked and thereby 
represented by our experiences. But it is simply not the case that the “blue” 
reflectance-type is more like the “purple” reflectance-type than the “green” 
reflectance-type, where these are the reflectance-types (colors) tracked and 
thereby represented by your consecutive experiences. In fact, if anything, the 
blue reflectance-type is more like the green one than the purple one (Byrne and 
Hilbert 2003, Pautz 2006b).  
At the same time, important recent research in neuroscience shows that 
phenomenal similarities and differences map nicely onto neural similarities 
and differences. Brouwer and Heeger sum up this research as follows:  
 
The visual system encodes color by means of a distributed 
[neural] representation [in area V4]. . . similar colors evoke 
similar patterns of [neural] activity, and neural representations 
of color [in V4] can be characterized by low-dimensional 
“neural color spaces” in which the positions of [experienced] 
colors capture similarities between corresponding patterns of 
activity (2013, 15454) 
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Indeed, when ordered according to similarity, these neural representations 
formed the circle, akin to the familiar hue circle. So your distributed internal 
V4 neural representation of the blue object resembles your V4 neural 
representation of the purple object more than your V4 neural representation of 
the green object. Other recent important work on the neural basis of color 
experience includes Danilova and Mollon (2012) and Schmidt, Neitz and Neitz 
(2014). In light of this recent research, a broadly internalist account of color 
experience is evidently more reasonable than an externalist theory such as 
tracking representationalism. Elsewhere I have developing this point more 
precisely by appealing to hypothetical “coincidental variation” cases, which 
differ from both inverted spectrum and inverted earth cases.5  
The point extends to non-visual modalities. For instance, phenomenal 
resemblances among smells radically fail to line up with objective 
resemblances among the corresponding chemical properties tracked, and 
thereby represented, by our olfactory system (Pautz 2013a). By contrast, recent 
research conducted by Youngentob et al. (2006), Howard et al. (2009) and 
others has shown that neural patterns in the olfactory system fall into a neural 
similarity space nicely matching phenomenal similarity space (similar to 
Brouwer and Heeger (2009) for color vision).6 Similar results have been found 
for the experience of taste (Crouzet et al. 2015). Finally, psychophysics has 
shown that there is huge mismatch between the qualitative structure auditory 
experiences (ratio relations among perceived loudness levels, categorical 
changes in phoneme perception, etc.) and the structure of the physical 
properties our auditory experiences track and thereby represent. To find the 
explanation, we must look inside the head (Chang 2010, Pautz 2013a). This is 
exactly the opposite of what tracking representationalists like Dretske and Tye 
suggest.  
In short, in many cases, externalists like Dretske and Tye have it 
backwards. Peer at the external physical properties tracked and represented by 
our experiences however much you like. That is not where you will find an 
explanation of the phenomenal structure of our experiences. So the explanation 
must reside in the “detailed functioning of the brain”. And the more we learn 
about the brain, the more this hypothesis is corroborated. My point here is not 
just that in the actual world experiential differences are always accompanied 
by neural differences. Contrary to what some have suggested (e. g. Prinz 2012, 
19), that fact alone provides no evidence against externalism about experience 
(Pautz 2013b, 168). My point relies on two additional empirical facts. First, in 
many cases, psychophysics shows that structural relations among experiences 
(similarity and difference, equal intervals, proportion) are not matched by the 
structural relations among the (highly unnatural) external physical properties 
that those experiences track. Second, at the same time, recent neuroscience has 
shown (often using the new technique of multivariate pattern analysis) that 
they are much better matched by structural relations among their neural 
correlates. These twin facts suggest that our experiences of sensible properties 
(sensible colors, smells, audible qualities) depend on neural processing, in a 
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way that can be demonstrated to be in conflict with tracking 
representationalism (Pautz 2013a). 
Once we accept an internalist account of the experience of “sensible 
properties”, the simplest and most uniform view is that the experience of all 
perceptible properties (including spatio-temporal ones) generally is internally 
determined. The brain-based identity theory is a view of this kind. Like the 
argument for externalism we considered earlier, this is a “generalization 
argument” – only it proceeds in the opposite direction.  
So there is a strong empirical case for internalism about experience. But 
then what about the more a priori “spatial argument” against internalism and 
for externalism that we started with? That argument suggests that spatial 
phenomenology, at least, does depend constitutively on links to the 
environment, contrary to a general internalist theory like the identity theory.  
In my view, the spatial argument is far from decisive, for a couple of 
reasons. To begin with, the spatial argument for externalism about experience 
depends on realism about the spatial properties that we phenomenally 
represent. The thought is that, since these properties are instantiated out in the 
external world, it’s natural to explain how we phenomenally represent them in 
terms of our having a visual system that interacts with instances of these very 
properties in the external world.  
But some have recently suggested a kind of irrealism about experienced 
spatial properties. This view may seem far-fetched but several philosophers 
have advocated it on the basis of contemporary physics (for discussion see Ney 
2013, pp. 177-181). One example is David Chalmers. In fact, Chalmers 
advocates a kind of generalized irrealist view. To illustrate, suppose you view 
a tomato. Then it seems to you that a certain quality, sensible redness, is 
coinstantiated with roundness. Since the 17th century scientific revolution, 
many have suggested that such sensible colors are not really instantiated by 
external objects. These “irrealists” about sensible color would admit the tomato 
has a reflectance. But, in their view, this reflectance is nothing like the sensible 
color presented in experience. Chalmers accepts this irrealist view of sensible 
colors on a priori grounds (2006, 82). I have also argued for the same view on 
entirely empirical grounds (Pautz 2006b, 2013a). What Chalmers does is to 
take irrealism one step further. The “real tomato” does not even instantiate the 
property being round that you phenomenally represent as coinstantiated with 
sensible redness, that is, the property having edges roughly equidistant from a 
common point. Chalmers (2006, 107) calls this “perfect roundness”; if you 
like, it is “roundness-as-we-see-it”. On his view, the tomato only has 
“imperfect roundness”, which is some arcane quantum mechanical property 
that is nothing like the familiar roundness you are directly acquainted with 
(2012, 296-297). In general, the basic spatial and temporal relations given in 
experience are just not out there. Chalmers thinks that this irrealist view is 
supported by relativity and certain interpretations of quantum mechanics 
(“wavefunction fundamentalism”). The result is a kind of uniform Kantian 
picture: the real world is “noumenal”.7 As Chalmers puts it:   
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In spatial experience, I think we are presented with certain 
primitive spatial properties. . . But I think that there is little 
reason to think that they are instantiated in our world. 
Certainly, it is not easy to see how [they could be instantiated] 
in a relativistic world, or in a string-theoretic world . . . (2012, 
333) 
 
Now, if Chalmers thinks that “perfect” roundness and redness not 
instantiated in the external world, where does he think they are instantiated? 
Does he perhaps think that they are mental qualia instantiated in the mind or 
the brain when you experience the tomato? No – of course, when you 
experience a tomato, perfect roundness (that is, the property having edges 
roughly equidistant from a common point) need not be instantiated inside your 
brain! Instead, Chalmers adopts a representationalist view. In having the 
tomato-like experience, you phenomenally represent perfect roundness and 
redness. So, they appear to be instantiated out there. Chalmers, then, accepts 
“External Directedness” where ‘roundness’ is understood to mean perfect 
roundness. But he thinks that, as it happens, nothing instantiates these 
properties - not even mental items in the head. It is only some other possible 
worlds (“Edenic worlds”) that they are instantiated by external objects, 
according to Chalmers.  
Of course, if such an irrealist view of experienced spatial properties is 
correct, then the spatial argument for externalism fails at the first step. We 
cannot explain how we phenomenally represent roundness-as-we-see-it (much 
less redness-as-we-see-it) in terms of being in an internal state that typically 
tracks the instantiation of that very property under biologically normal 
conditions, for the simple reason that it could never be instantiated in this 
world! The irrealist view goes with internalism about the spatial intentionality 
built into normal visual experiences.8   
My point here is not that this irrealist view is definitely right. My point is 
just that it may be correct. So, the spatial argument for externalism about visual 
experience is not so cut and dried. (However, in what follows, for the sake of 
discussion, I will often write as if realism about experienced spatial properties 
correct.) In fact, although I cannot go into this here, there are other empirical 
reasons to doubt externalist theories of the experience of space. So it is 
worthwhile to consider the question of whether we can develop an alternative 
internalist theory.9  
There is another, more basic reason why the spatial argument isn’t a 
decisive argument against internalism about experience. That argument is just 
an inference to the best explanation. The argument is that an externalist theory, 
such as the “tracking theory”, provides the best explanation of the spatial 
intentionality built into many experiences. So, one way to block the argument 
would be to show that there is a viable rival internalist explanation of the 
experience of spatial features. Such a theory would explain how BIV, just on 
the basis of its internal neural states, can “phenomenally represent” roundness, 
even though it fails to track round things.  
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This rest of this essay is devoted to the question of what such an internalist 
theory might look like. I begin by developing the puzzle about spatial 
representation that is the main focus of this essay. In particular, I will argue 
(§§2-5) that internalists must concede that the “phenomenal representation 
relation” is an irreducible relation. This may look like a reductio of 
internalism. However, I will briefly suggest (§6) that this is not the right way 
to look at it. Internalists can live with this result by accepting a non-reductive 
“grounding” account of the phenomenal representation of space.  
 
2. From Envatted Brains to Irreducible Intentionality: The BIV Argument 
Sketched 
 
The BIV argument is designed to establish a conditional claim: if internalism 
about experience is right, then a non-reductive view of phenomenal 
representation follows.  
First I will only describe the setup and list the steps of the argument. 
Afterwards (§3-5) I will explain and defend those steps in turn. I will continue 
to focus on the tomato-like experience property R. However, just about any 
visual experience could illustrate the argument. I will also continue to focus on 
the brain-based identity theory defended by Block, McLaughlin, Papineau, and 
others.   
I begin by saying more about the identity theory. I have said that the 
identity theory holds that R is necessarily identical with an intrinsic neuro-
computational property of the brain (“intrinsic” in the sense that any duplicate 
brain must share the property). But what kind of property? Suppose that 
whether or not a subject has tomato-like experience R co-varies with their 
having some fairly local neural property V in the visual cortex. No identity 
theorist holds that V all by itself – say, isolated in a bottle - would constitute R. 
Rather, identity theorists hold that R is necessarily identical with some more 
global neural state, incorporating certain further conditions. Let N be the more 
global neural state that, by contrast to V alone, is necessary and sufficient for 
R, according to identity theorists.  
What might N involve? Ned Block (2005, Box 1), one of the most 
prominent defenders of a brain-based approach to experience, suggests that we 
can approach the issue by asking: what could be removed from your brain, and 
what must be kept, while you still continue to have R? Exactly which brain 
areas are required is unknown at present. But Block tentatively suggests that N 
probably has to incorporate a “recurrent feedback loop”. Block (2007a, 482) 
also notes that “there is some evidence that there is a single neural background 
of all experience involving connections between the cortex and the upper brain 
stem including the thalamus”. 
But there are other things we could remove. As Block (2012, sect. 10) 
writes, citing recent research, “the basic phenomenology of vision can survive 
vast destruction in motor areas and early sensory areas on both sides of the 
brain”. You could have R because of direct stimulation of your visual cortex, 
without involving the eyes. In addition, we could remove connections to the 
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body: for, contrary to behaviorists, a quadriplegic, or someone with complete 
locked-in syndrome, could have R. Therefore N, the minimal sufficient 
condition for R, doesn’t involve the eyes or to the motor output systems (e. g. 
motor neurons in the spinal cord and brainstem).10  
Now for the setup of the argument. Suppose that, in another possible world, 
a brain-in-a-vat (“BIV”) just pops into existence “out of the blue” (like a 
“Botlzman brain”), and then starts to undergo neural state N for five minutes 
purely by chance, without any external cause (Block 2012, sect. 12). Suppose, 
further, that BIV only has the neural machinery required to have N and hence 
R. So BIV doesn’t have, for instance, receptor systems (eyes, ears, etc.) or a 
motor output system. So, although I called it a “brain-in-a-vat”, BIV is not 
exactly like a complete brain. Indeed, it has no evolutionary history and 
belongs to no species (in fact, we could assume that BIV occupies an otherwise 
empty universe, so that it is a “brain in the void”). So it doesn’t really count as 
a human brain. It is merely an intrinsic duplicate of a significant part of your 
actual brain as you view a tomato.   
Still, the identity theory implies that BIV has the tomato-like experience 
property R. Likewise for any internalist theory. This cannot be disputed. For I 
have stipulated that BIV has N, where “N” is just shorthand for whatever 
neural property is, on that theory, the minimal neural basis of R.  
This is not a trivial implication. As we shall see, Dretske and Tye deny it, 
on the basis of their “tracking representationalism”.11 In what follows, I will 
assume it for the sake of argument.  
My BIV argument will now proceed as follows: 
 
Assumption: An internalist theory of experience is right, so 
that, by having neural property N, BIV has experience property 
R. (Assume for conditional proof.) 
External Directedness about R: necessarily, if any individual 
has R, then that individual has an experience of a round item of 
some sort; that individual has an experience that “matches the 
world” only if some item is present that is round. So, in having 
R, BIV has such an experience.  
Phenomenal Representation: If BIV has an experience that 
“matches the world” only if some is present that is round, then it 
stands in the following dyadic relation to the property being 
round: it has an experience that “matches the world” only if 
some item has this property. Call this the “phenomenal 
representation relation”.  
Irreducibility: If BIV bears the dyadic phenomenal 
representation to the property of being round, then this relation 
is irreducible. For BIV bears no suitable dyadic physical-
functional relation to the property of being round, with which 
the phenomenal representation relation might be identified (e. g. 
the kind “tracking relation” invoked by Dretske and Tye).   
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Conclusion: If an internalist theory of experience is right, so 
that BIV has R, then the dyadic phenomenal representation 
relation is irreducible.  
 
The conclusion of the BIV argument may be represented as follows: 
 
[Insert Pautz Figure “23-01” about here] 
 
Figure 1: Internalism about experience implies that the 
phenomenal representation is irreducible (represented here by 
the arrow sticking out from the brain).  
 
If the internalist accepts the BIV argument, then he faces the question of 
how to understand the relationship between the irreducible phenomenal 
representation relation and the physical world. This constitutes the puzzle of 
the phenomenal representation relation for internalists.  
This puzzle is bound up with another puzzle for internalists, which we 
might call the puzzle of sensible properties. As we noted before, in having 
tomato-like experience R, BIV has an experience as of a certain distinctive 
reddish quality filling a round area in space; that is, BIV phenomenally 
represents sensible redness as well as roundness. We saw that externalists like 
Tye and Dretske have an attractively straightforward (though arguably false) 
view of sensible redness: sensible redness is an external reflectance property 
that really is co-instantiated with roundness. But internalists about experience 
cannot take this objectivist view. For they hold that internal neural state N 
suffices for the experience of sensible redness, even in BIV cases where it 
doesn’t track any reflectance property in the external world. The empirical 
research on color vision I cited earlier supports this brain-based view. But then, 
according to internalists, what in the world might sensible redness be, if not an 
objective property of external things in physical space? 
Ned Block would apparently say that, when BIV (or, for that matter, an 
actual person) has the tomato-like experience, sensible redness (or what he 
calls the “red quale”) is somehow instantiated “in the mind” (2007b, 74). On 
one version of this view, sensible redness is instantiated by a literally round 
“visual field region”. But there exists no reddish and literally round “visual 
field region” anywhere within BIV (Peacocke 2008, 14). On Block’s own 
view, sensible redness (the “red quale”) is instantiated by the BIV’s experience 
itself, which, on his identity theory, is just a neural state N.  Now, it is an 
evident fact that, if the BIV (or an actual person) has the tomato-like-
experience, then it at least seems to the subject that sensible redness (the “red 
quale”) fills a round region. (If Block’s term “red quale” does not refer to the 
distinctive quality that seems to fill a round region when one has the tomato-
like experience, then I do not know what it could refer to.) So Block’s view 
requires that a quality that does not in fact fill a round region (because it is in 
fact a quality of a non-round neural state) somehow appears to fill a round 
region (see Pautz 2003a, 286-290). Sydney Shoemaker (1994) is an internalist 
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who suggests a different view of sensible redness. He suggests that it is a 
response-dependent “appearance property” (roughly, a disposition to produce a 
certain neural state in a population) that is really instantiated by external 
objects (like round tomatoes) in our environment but not in BIV’s 
environment. Other internalists have argued that sensible redness is a primitive 
property that is not instantiated anywhere, on both a priori grounds (Chalmers 
2006, Horgan 2014) and empirical grounds (Pautz 2006b, 2013a).  
If internalism is true, then which of these views on the nature and 
whereabouts of sensible redness is best? And what makes it the case that BIV 
ostensibly experiences sensible redness as bound with roundness? These 
questions make up the puzzle of the sensible properties for internalists.  
In developing the BIV argument for the irreducibility of phenomenal 
representation, I will mostly ignore the issue of the nature of sensible 
properties like sensible redness. I will mostly focus on how the BIV might 
phenomenally represent spatial properties like roundness. We will see that the 
BIV argument goes through no matter what view of sensible properties the 
internalist adopts.  
Next I turn to elaboration and defense of the steps of the BIV argument for 
the irreducibility of phenomenal representation.  
 
3. First Step: External Directedness  
 
The first step of the BIV argument is this: 
 
External Directedness: necessarily, if any individual has 
tomato-like experience R, then that individual has an 
experience as of a round item of some kind. Further, that 
experience fully matches the world only if there is some item 
present that is round, that is, that has edges roughly 
equidistant from a common point. 
 
I call this ‘External Directedness’, because when our experiences are “directed 
at” items of various shapes and standing in variation spatial relations, there 
need not be such items in our head. I already briefly alluded to External 
Directedness in the seductive “spatial argument” for externalism about 
experience (§1). Now I will clarify and defend it in more detail.  
The notion of “matching the world” employed in the formulation of 
External Directedness can be explained by examples. Suppose you have the 
tomato-like experience R while hallucinating. Your experience does not match 
the world if there is really only a rectangular table before you. But if there 
happens to be before you a tomato on a white background, then we can all 
recognize a sense in which your hallucination does match the world (many 
philosophers have discussed such “veridical hallucinations”).  
My BIV argument only requires that the single experience R is necessarily 
directed at a round item. But I think similar claims apply to other visual 
experiences: other experience-types might be necessarily directed at a square 
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object, or an object moving from left to right, or one object being above 
another. 
Why accept External Directedness? The initial argument is based on 
reflection. Consider the sentence “a round thing is present”. Since language is 
conventional, we can easily imagine hypothetical cases in which those very 
marks mean that a triangular thing is present, or mean nothing at all. But could 
someone have R (an experience exactly like your experience of a stationary 
tomato on a white background), while not having an experience as of a 
stationary round thing, a thing whose edges are roughly equidistant from a 
common point? For instance, could someone have that very experience, and 
yet have an experience that is correctly characterized as an experience as of a 
triangular thing moving to the right? That just seems impossible. So even 
when BIV has R, BIV has an experience as of a round thing. This, together 
with the fact that there is no round thing there, is the only explanation of the 
evident fact that BIV has a non-veridical experience. As Block (Block 2012, 
sect. 12) puts it, BIV is “tricked”.  
There are other arguments for External Directedness. For instance, if a BIV 
with the general capacity for thought had R, it would thereby be in a position to 
have a false (but justified) thought with the content something is that way, a 
thought that is true only if something is round. Despite its sorry state, it could 
acquire a demonstrative concept of roundness. In general, having visual 
experiences is what explains our ability to form concepts of spatial properties 
and relations. It has a unique explanatory significance. How could this be so, if 
visual experience did not itself have built-in spatial content? (For another 
important argument for External Directedness, see Chalmers 2006, 74.)  
The assertion that some visual experiences are necessarily externally 
directed is neutral on many questions. For instance, one question is: when you 
view a tilted penny, is the type of experience you have necessarily as of a thing 
that is elliptical, or of a thing that is tilted and round, or as of a thing that is 
“elliptical-from-here” (the view-point relative but objective property of having 
a shape that would be occluded by an ellipse placed in a plane perpendicular to 
the line of sight)?12 Or are multiple answers correct? And do the spatial 
predicates needed to characterize the full accuracy conditions of experience 
express spatial properties that physical objects sometimes really have (Horgan 
2014), or does contemporary physics show that this is not so (Chalmers 2012). 
As we shall see, my BIV argument is neutral on these issues.  
External Directedness is also neutral between the main theories of 
experience. For instance, while it is implied by all versions of 
representationalism (including those of Tye, Dretske, Chalmers, and Horgan), 
it is also strictly speaking compatible with a purely non-representational view 
of visual experience, which denies that visual experience is essentially 
representational. In particular, the internalist might deny that BIV’s tomato-
like experience R has any “representational content” at all (perhaps on 
externalist grounds). Still, the internalist might accommodate External 
Directedness by invoking the traditional sense datum theory or Peacocke’s 
sensationalism (2008). On this approach, BIV counts as having an experience 
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“as of a round item”, in accordance with the letter of External Directedness, 
because BIV has an experience of a reddish and literally round visual field 
region. On this view, the experience “matches” a scene, only if the scene 
contains an object with the same shape as the visual field region.  
But such a “visual field region” would be a peculiar non-physical item, for 
there is certainly no such round physical object inside BIV’s brain. So 
internalists should reject this view. They should not recognize in this case the 
real existence of any such object (Peacocke 2008, 14).  
So I think internalists should accept a broadly “representational” 
interpretation of External Directedness. BIV’s experience simply has a false 
“representational content” to the effect of there is a round item right there, or 
that is round.  
This still doesn’t amount to “representationalism” about experience. Even 
on a “representational” interpretation, External Directedness only implies that 
in some cases visual experiences are necessarily connected with 
representational properties, specifically, representational properties involving 
space. This falls short of the representationalist thesis that, necessarily, all 
experiential facts consist in facts about the contents of our experiences. So 
even anti-representationalists could accept External Directedness.  
In fact, Ned Block, a well-known anti-representationalist, favors External 
Directedness. He writes:  
 
[Representationalism] is the view that the phenomenology of an 
experience is the experience’s representational (intentional) 
content. I am an opponent. But I am willing to allow that every 
phenomenological state has representational content, even that 
the phenomenology consists – in part – in its having that 
representational content. (2007a, 538).  
 
Elsewhere Block (1995, 278) explicitly says that some types of visual 
phenomenology are “intrinsically” tied to certain spatial representational 
contents (there is a circle there, there is a square there, etc.), in agreement 
with External Directedness.  
External Directedness is a modal claim. It says that R is necessarily 
directed at a round item. So the case for it is incomplete until consider whether 
it holds up in hypothetical cases. 
Imagine that, on a Twin Earth, tomatoes are (what we would call) ellipsoid. 
Nevertheless, suppose that our Twin Earthians are wired up so that they 
normally have experience R (which we have on viewing round tomatoes) on 
viewing these ellipsoid tomatoes. Is R in any sense an experience as of a round 
thing, even on this Twin Earth where it is normally caused by ellipsoid 
objects? External Directedness implies a “yes” verdict. There are two 
reasonable accounts of the case compatible with this verdict. (i) On one 
account, while we get it right, our counterparts are regularly subject to a mild 
shape illusion. Horgan’s realism about experienced spatial features (2014) 
implies this verdict. (ii) There is also Chalmers’s irrealist view, which I 
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described before. On his view, in accordance with External Directedness, R is 
necessarily directed at a “round” thing (or in his terminology, a “perfectly” 
round thing) on Twin Earth as well as Earth. But neither tomatoes on Twin 
Earth nor tomatoes here on Earth possess this property, “perfect roundness”, or 
“roundness-as-we-see-it”. Rather, on the different planets, tomatoes merely 
have different versions of “imperfect” roundness; they only have (different) 
arcane quantum-mechanical properties, neither of which is anything like the 
“perfect” or roundness given in experience (roundness-as-we-see-it). The result 
is that neither our experience of our tomatoes nor our twins’ experience of 
their tomatoes is perfectly veridical!13   
Let me address a final issue. You might think identity theorists, and 
internalists in general, should reject External Directedness, blocking my BIV 
argument at the first step.  
In fact, the BIV case itself can be used to illustrate the thought. On 
internalism about experience, in having neural state N, BIV has the tomato-like 
experience R, despite being isolated from the external world. But, assuming a 
standard externalist approach to perceptual representation (e. g. Burge 2010), 
even though BIV has R (the very same experience you have on viewing a 
tomato), BIV cannot count as having an experience as of a round thing, 
contrary to External Directedness. For, in BIV, the neural state N does not have 
the required biological function of tracking round things, or indeed things of 
any kind. In fact, assuming standard externalism, BIV’s highly detailed 
tomato-like visual experience has no content at all (somewhat like a state of 
undirected depression). In the BIV scenario, there is simply no sense in which 
the tomato-like experience R is essentially an experience as of a round item (e. 
g. no non-physical round “sense datum” or “visual field region” is present 
either), even though it is exactly like your experience of a tomato. In this 
regard, the tomato-like experience R is like the marks ‘a round thing is 
present’: this very experience could have had no spatial content at all, or any 
spatial content you please.  
However, I think that internalists about experience (including identity 
theorists) should accept External Directedness and reject this argument. For 
there are very strong arguments in favor of External Directedness, as we have 
seen. (Again, if BIV’s tomato-like experience has no content at all, why do 
consider it “non-veridical”?) Chalmers (2006) and Horgan (2014) are examples 
of philosophers who combine internalism about experience with External 
Directedness. As we have seen, Block, too, says that some visual experiences 
are “intrinsically” linked to certain spatial contents.  
To block the above argument against External Directedness, internalists 
about experience should simply reject the assumption of externalism about 
phenomenal representation on which it depends. As Chalmers (2006, 83) and 
Horgan (2014) have emphasized, even if externalism is right in some cases 
(representational states about individuals or natural kinds like tomato), it 
simply does not follow it is true for all representational properties, including 
the representational properties of experience. Some basic forms of phenomenal 
representation must be internally-determined, if they are (as Block puts it) 
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“intrinsically” linked with phenomenology and phenomenology is internally-
determined. So, for instance, by having the tomato-like experience R, BIV 
counts as having an experience as of a round object. This, together the absence 
of a round thing, explains why the experience is non-veridical. I don’t see how 
the internalist could plausibly deny this.14  
 
4. Second Step: Phenomenal Representation 
 
The ultimate aim of my BIV argument is to show that internalism about 
experience requires a non-reductive theory of phenomenal representation. The 
first step was External Directedness: if BIV has the tomato-like experience R, 
then BIV thereby has experience as of a round thing, an experience that 
matches the world only if a round thing is present. The next step is to argue 
that, if this is right, then BIV bears the “phenomenal representation relation” to 
the property of being round (as depicted in Figure 1).  
I assume a minimal realism about properties: there exists a rich set of 
spatial properties in the BIV scenario, instantiated by various objects (objects 
with which BIV cannot causally interact).  
If there are properties, then the claim that BIV has an experience that is 
matches the world only if something is round is equivalent to the claim that 
BIV has an experience that matches the world only if something has the 
property of being round. This claim in turn immediately implies that BIV bears 
a representational relation to the property or attribute of being round. A rough 
gloss on this relation is as follows: xλxλy(x has an experience that matches the 
world only if something has property y). In the introduction, I called this the 
phenomenal representation relation, following Chalmers (2004). I will 
continue to use this terminology. As Burge (2010, 380) puts it, experience 
involves the perceptual attribution “of certain types or attributes—such as 
roundness, being to the left of”. (My focus here on the general element of 
perceptual content is of course consistent with acknowledging a singular 
element.) In general, if you have the general capacity for thought, and if you 
phenomenally represent a certain property, then you thereby have the capacity 
to predicate that property of things in thought.  
So if identity theorists accept External Directedness, as I have argued they 
should, then they must claim that, when BIV undergoes neural state N (on this 
view, visual experience property R), BIV thereby phenomenally represents 
roundness. As I have defined it, this is a dyadic relation between subjects and 
properties. Many internalists already accept this result, for instance Chalmers 
(2006, 107) and Horgan (2014). It is a very minimal claim that doesn’t go 
beyond the pretheoretical claim of External Directedness. For instance, it 
doesn’t require the additional claim that BIV’s experience “aims at the truth” 
in the way beliefs do, or “lays claim” to the presence of a round thing 
(Papineau 2015, sect. 15). In fact, on some interpretations, I myself would 
reject this additional claim (Pautz 2010c, fn. 11).   
The argument generalizes to other spatial and temporal properties. 
Assuming internalism, BIV might have all the same experiences as you, by 
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having the same underlying neural states. Then, like you, BIV stands in the 
phenomenal representation relation to a large variety of spatial properties and 
relations, such as having orientation l, being above, having an edge at viewer 
relative place p, etc. That is to say, it has experiences that match the world on 
the condition that there are things before BIV having these properties. 
True, BIV does not see any instances of these properties. But the general 
properties still exist, and (by my argument) BIV bears a representational 
relation to them, in the above sense. In the actual world, whenever an 
individual has a hallucination, they likewise bear the phenomenal 
representation relation to perceptible properties that aren’t instantiated before 
them. Indeed, something similar happens whenever you have a false belief. If 
you mistakenly believe something is the next room is round, then you bear the 
following relation to being round, even though it is not instantiated in your 
vicinity: you have a belief that is true on the condition that something in the 
next room have this property.  
Recall that I am assuming that in the BIV scenario all of the relevant 
properties are instantiated by some objects or other (objects BIV cannot 
causally interact with). So even internalists who are leery of Platonic, 
uninstantiated properties – for instance, Mendelovici (2010) and Kriegel 
(2011) - must admit that these properties exist in the BIV case, and that in this 
case BIV bears the phenomenal representation relation to them. So they too 
face the question I am leading up to of whether this relation is reducible (§5).15  
Of course, BIV phenomenally represents what I previously (in §1 and §2) 
called sensible colors in addition to spatial properties. For BIV has exactly the 
same experience R you had on viewing a particular tomato. And the following 
expanded version of External Directedness is hard to deny:  
 
 External Directedness II: Necessarily, if an individual has the tomato-
like experience R, that individual has an experience as of an item that is 
round and reds.  
 
Here the predicate ‘reds’ could be defined ostensively: it expresses that 
familiar, salient quality which seems to you and your BIV counterpart to fill a 
round region when you have the tomato-like experience R. (I take it that such 
properties exist, for we can say true things about them: for instance, that reds is 
more like oranges than greens.) It appears to BIV that this property is co-
instantiated with roundness. One view is that it is a property of a literally round 
“visual field region” (Peacocke 2008), but we should reject such items. We 
should rather say that the BIV phenomenally represents this sensible property. 
(Chalmers 2006, Horgan 2014).   
BIV might phenomenally represent various other sensible properties. For 
instance, if it has an auditory hallucination, it has an experience as of an event 
having a certain location and certain audible qualities (sensible pitch and 
loudness). Its auditory experiences would fully match the world only if these 
properties are co-instantiated in a space around it. In that sense, BIV 
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phenomenally represents the conjunction of a certain location and certain 
audible qualities. 
To sum up so far: internalists must hold that, simply in virtue of its neural 
states, BIV somehow phenomenally represents a large variety of spatial 
properties and relations as well as certain sensible properties. 
 
5. Final Step: Irreducibility 
 
The final step of the BIV argument is that, if BIV bears the phenomenal 
representation relation to spatial and other properties, then this relation is 
irreducible.  
Before developing the argument, let me briefly explain what I mean by 
saying that a property or relation is reducible. Roughly, I say that a property P 
is reducible to properties and relations Q, R, S . . . just in case P is identical 
with a complex property built up from Q, R, S . . . (so that Q, R, S . . . are 
“ontologically prior” to P).16 The identity theory that is the focus of my 
discussion is reductive theory of monadic experience properties. On this 
theory, the experience property R just is the complex neural-computational 
property N.  
Many advocate reductionism about all “manifest image” properties: they 
hold that they are one and all nothing but complex properties built up from 
some limited set of properties and relations from the “scientific image” (e. g. 
the properties of the physical sciences plus certain “topic-neutral” properties 
and relations causes and is a part of). In this sense, they defend “reductive 
physicalism”. They include Armstrong, Field, Jackson, Lewis, Papineau, Sider, 
and Smart, among many others. I myself think that this approach is right for 
nearly all manifest image properties instantiated in the world (with the 
phenomenal representation relation being a major exception).  
I generally favor reductionism because it provides the simplest explanation 
of the relation between the manifest image and the scientific image. It is 
ontologically simple, since it holds that manifest image properties are just 
identical with enormously complex properties built up from scientific image 
properties. It is also simple in its stock of brute principles. It only requires 
general principles of property construction that everyone accepts. True, it 
requires brute identities between manifest image properties and complex 
physical-functional properties. But, as many have emphasized (e. g. Block 
2003), identities have a very attractive feature: they do not cry out for further 
explanation. They are “explanation-stoppers”. And, intuitively, identities do 
not add to the complexity of a theory.  
Further, as Sider (2011, chap. 7) has recently emphasized, standard 
arguments against reductionism about the manifest image fail. For instance, 
along with Sider, I use “reduction” broadly enough that functionalist theories 
are versions of reductionism. So reductionism in my sense accommodates 
multiple realizability (e. g being a chair might be identical with a functional 
property). In addition, the history of failed attempts to provide complete 
reductions does not show that such reductions do not exist. The complete 
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reductions might be deeply a posteriori, or just too complex for us to specify 
(perhaps even infinitary).  
Now for an important point emphasized by Hartry Field in his seminal 
“Mental Representation” (1978) and in a recent (2001) postscript to that essay. 
Philosophers often only focus on the reduction of monadic properties (with one 
“argument-place”). For instance, identity theorists focus on monadic 
experience properties like having a headache. But, as Field notes, there also 
exist relations. And, just as we can ask whether a monadic property is 
reducible, we can ask the same of a relation. To suppose the question is less 
pressing for relations would be an unjustified double standard.  
Field focuses on relations concerning cognitive and linguistic 
representation: individual x believes proposition y, individual x is thinking of 
existing concrete object y, name x refers to object y, and predicate x is satisfied 
by object y. Other relations of philosophical interest include x causes y and fact 
x provides a reason to perform action y. I have added a relation to list: the 
phenomenal representation relation. 
My focus is on identity theory. Identity theorists (Block, McLaughlin, 
Papineau) must heed Field’s point. Even if they are right that monadic 
experience properties reduce to monadic neuro-computational properties of 
subjects, I have shown that they must also recognize the dyadic phenomenal 
representation relation between subjects and perceptible properties. And we 
can ask: according to identity theorists, is this relation reducible to some 
dyadic physical-functional relation between subjects and those perceptible 
properties, or not? This would require an interesting identity-claim of the 
following form:  
 
[#] λxλy(subject x phenomenally represents property y) = λxλy(x . 
. . y)  
 
I will now argue that, even if identity theorists are right that monadic 
experience properties are reducible to monadic neural properties, they must say 
that the dyadic phenomenal representation relation is irreducible.17   
The strategy of the argument is simple. As we have seen, on internalism, 
BIV bears the phenomenal representation relation to roundness and other 
perceptible properties. But BIV is isolated from the world. So it bears no 
interesting dyadic physical-functional relation to such properties, such as the 
tracking relation invoked by Dretske and Tye. In brief, given internalism about 
experience, our standard externalist models for reducing representational 
relations fail in the special case of the phenomenal representation relation. I 
will also provide a principled reason (the disjunction problem) for thinking that 
internalists cannot accept any alternative internalist model for reducing this 
relation. Let me explain these points in turn.  
Broadly speaking, standard externalist theories of representational relations 
fall into two categories: input-based theories that emphasize what a state is apt 
to be caused by, and behavior-oriented theories that emphasize what actions a 
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state is apt to cause. But, given internalism, both are ruled out for the 
phenomenal representation relation.  
The tracking representationalism of Tye and Dretske discussed in §1 
provides an example of an externalist, input-based theory of phenomenal 
representation. Recall that tracking representationalists identify all perceptible 
properties, including sensible colors, with objective physical properties of 
external objects. Further, according to tracking representationalists, when 
individuals have experiences, the dyadic phenomenal representation relation 
that they bear to such properties is nothing but a complex tracking relation:  
 
λxλy(x phenomenally represents property y) = λxλy(x is in a 
inner state that realizes an experience and that would be caused 
by the instantiation of y were conditions biologically normal) 
 
Call the relation named on the right-hand side the tracking relation. Then 
the idea is that the phenomenal representation relation just is the tracking 
relation.  
Let me unpack this. What makes an inner state “realize an experience”? 
One idea is that its content must be cognitively accessible (Tye 2000, 62; 
Dretske 1995, 19; Prinz 2012). Another idea is that it must only satisfy some 
general neural background condition (for discussion see Block 2007a). This 
issue will not play a role in what follows. Biologically normal conditions are 
conditions in which the sensory systems are “operating as they were designed 
to do in the sort of external environment in which they were designed to” (Tye 
2000, 138). (This is Tye’s version; Dretske’s is very similar.) This view 
provides a neat account of hallucination. In hallucination, you can bear the 
phenomenal representation relation to properties that are not currently 
instantiated in your vicinity (e. g. being round and reddish), because you are in 
a state that would be caused by the instantiation of those properties under 
biologically normal conditions.  
But internalists about experience cannot identify the phenomenal 
representation relation with the tracking relation.  
To see this, consider BIV. BIV is not attached to a body. It lacks eyes and 
the other receptor components of the visual system. So its inner neural state, N, 
is causally cut off from the environment. It doesn’t track anything under 
“biologically normal conditions”. Indeed, since BIV did not naturally evolve, 
there is no such thing what is “biologically normal” for it.  
Granted, BIV’s neural state N would track roundness, if N were “plugged 
into” a certain situation: for instance, if it were linked with a receptor system 
and a body in the same way it is in normal humans (Papineau 2014, 30). But 
recall the basic physical facts. N is just a distributed neural pattern occurring in 
BIV. It could have been causally connected to any shape you please (in 
general, anything can cause anything). (Compare: the expression “round” 
could have been use refer to any shape you please.) For instance, if N were 
plugged into a different neural environment, it could equally have tracked 
being a triangle. It also could have tracked any external color you please. In 
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fact, if it were hooked up to a computer, it might even track the patterns of bits 
in that computer providing the “sensory inputs”! Since BIV lacks an 
evolutionary history and belongs to no species, there is nothing to select one of 
these counterfactual situations as the “right” or “biologically appropriate” 
situation for BIV.18    
The conclusion that tracking theorists like Dretske and Tye would draw is 
that, since BIV does not track any unique set of properties (even 
counterfactually), it does not phenomenally represent any. So, on their view, it 
entirely lacks experience. But, as I have argued, internalists must say that BIV 
does indeed have tomato-like experience R, and does phenomenally represent 
roundness and sensible redness and so on. So the conclusion they must draw is 
rather that the phenomenal representation is distinct from any tracking relation.  
Consider next behavioral theories of representation. For instance, Evans 
(1985, 385) famously said that an experience “acquires a spatial content for an 
organism by being linked with behavioral output”. A toy behavior-based 
reduction of the phenomenal representation relation might go as follows:  
 
λxλy(x phenomenally represents property y) = λxλy(x is in an 
inner state that realizes an experience and that, in typical 
members of the appropriate population, grounds the disposition 
to behave in ways “appropriate to” an object with property y) 
 
Call the relation named on the right-hand side the behavioral relation. 
Then the idea is that the phenomenal representation relation just is the 
behavioral relation.  
So, for instance, when you (a normal human) have N, then you have 
behavioral dispositions appropriate to a red and round object at place p: for 
instance, to reach out to place p and grasp exactly as if a round thing is at p, 
and to draw a round image if asked to draw a picture of what you see, to say 
“that’s red”, and so on. And when you have an experience of a green triangle 
you have another suite of sensorimotor dispositions. Such behavioral 
dispositions determine what properties you phenomenally represent, according 
to the behavioral theory.  
Now for general reasons the behavioral theory of phenomenal 
representation is hopeless. There is simply no backward road from behavior 
back to the content of experience. What does it even mean to say that some set 
of behavioral dispositions is “appropriate” to an object with property y? For 
instance, what are the behavioral dispositions that are uniquely “appropriate 
to” or “fit” an object of specific shade of red, or a specific shade of white? The 
possibility of behaviorally undetectable spectrum inversion suggests that there 
is no such thing. 
Even setting aside these problems, internalists about experience cannot 
identify the phenomenal representation relation with the behavioral relation.  
To see this, consider BIV. BIV is not a complete human body. It is merely 
a duplicate of part of a brain. So it has no interesting behavioral dispositions. If 
you throw a tomato at it, it will just sit there.    
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Of course, in normal actual humans, N grounds certain behavioral 
dispositions. But this point cannot save the behavioral theory. For, in some 
other possible species, N might be hooked up to quite differently to a body, 
resulting in quite different behavioral responses. Indeed, it could be hooked up 
to a computer, so that its “behavioral responses” are digits on a computer 
screen. Since BIV belongs to no species and has no evolutionary history, there 
is nothing that could select one possible species as “the appropriate 
population” or one embodiment as the “normal embodiment”.   
It follows that BIV has no unique set of behavioral dispositions. Therefore, 
it does not bear the behavioral relation to any properties whatever. 
Nevertheless, as I have argued, internalists must say that BIV phenomenally 
represents roundness and sensible redness and so on. So they must conclude 
that the phenomenal representation relation is distinct from the behavioral 
relation.  
In sum, BIV doesn’t bear to its environment any of the causal, 
informational, theological, or sensorimotor relations invoked in any of our 
standard theories of representational relations. So, when it comes to providing 
a reductive theory of the phenomenal representation relation, it is as if 
internalists about experience have both hands tied behind their backs. If they 
can provide a reductive theory of phenomenal representation, it would have to 
be radically different from all current theories. How might such a theory go? 
I will consider such a reductive theory. I call it “disjunctivism”. But it fails. 
Indeed, it will lead us to a principled reason why any internalist reductive 
theory of the phenomenal representation relation must fail.  
Let us focus on the brain-based identity theory of monadic experience 
properties. Recall that on the identity theory the tomato-like experience 
property R is identical with the neural property N. Let N1, N2, N3, . . . be the 
indefinitely-many other neural properties which, on identity theory, are 
identical with some experience property or other that individuals actually 
undergo (for instance, the experience of a square object, the experience of an 
object moving to the left, an experience of one object above another, and so 
on).  
We can reach “disjunctivism” about the phenomenal representation relation 
in two steps. First of all, if what I have argued for so far is correct, then 
identity theorists are committed to indefinitely-many entailments of the 
following form:   
 
Having N entails phenomenally representing being round (if it exists) 
Having N also entails phenomenally representing being redS 
Having N1 entails phenomenally representing being square 
Having N2 entails phenomenally representing moving to the left 
Having N4 entails phenomenally representing being greenS 
Having N5 entails phenomenally representing having pitch p and lo     
cation l . . . etc. 
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The identity theorist is committed to these entailments, because each of the 
listed neural properties is identical with a unique experience property, which 
(by my argument) necessitates phenomenally representing a unique cluster of 
properties.  
Now this list does not specify a dyadic physical-functional relation (having 
two argument-places) with which the dyadic phenomenal representation 
relation might be identified. It does not specify an identity of form [#] above.  
But you might think that the list leads naturally to such an identity. For, if 
all the above entailments obtain, perhaps identity theorists can just identify the 
phenomenal representation relation with some disjunctive relation of the 
following kind: 
 
λxλy(x phenomenally represents property y) = λxλy(x has neural 
property N and y = being round, or x has neural property N1 and y 
= being square, or x has neural property N2 and y = moving to the 
left, or x has neural property . . . and y = . . . and so on).  
 
In short, the idea is that the phenomenal representation relation just is the 
disjunctive relation. This relation is basically just a “big” list of ordered pairs. 
Notice this is not disjunctivism about monadic experience properties such as R 
(we’re assuming those are identical with non-disjunctive neural properties); 
rather, it is disjunctivism about the phenomenal representation relation.  
Take an example. If you plug ‘BIV’ into ‘x’ and ‘being round’ into ‘y’, you 
get a truth (because then the first disjunct becomes true). Hence BIV bears the 
disjunctive relation to being round. So, on disjunctivism about phenomenal 
representation, BIV bears the phenomenal representation relation to being 
round, as desired.  
On disjunctivism about phenomenal representation, nothing “unifies” the 
disjuncts. For instance, we saw that the BIV case shows that internalists cannot 
say that what is common between the disjuncts is that the relevant neural states 
track the corresponding properties.  
Disjunctivism about phenomenal representation is exactly analogous to a 
reduction of the name-object reference relation famously considered and 
rejected by Field in “Tarski’s Theory of Truth” (1972). On this theory, word x 
refers to object y iff x is the word ‘France’ and y = France or x is the name 
‘Eiffel Tower’ and y = the Eiffel Tower . . . and so on for every name of 
English. Field notes we would never accept such disjunctive reductions in 
other cases (he discusses being in pain and having valence n). So we should 
not accept such a theory of the reference relation.  
Block (2002, 412) is also skeptical of such disjunctive identities because 
they are not “explanatory”. McLaughlin is skeptical for a different reason 
(2003, 181). So these identity theorists presumably would be skeptical about 
disjunctivism about the phenomenal representation relation (though neither 
discusses this case).  
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Indeed, I think that identity theorists (Block, McLaughlin, Papineau) and 
other internalists (Chalmers, Horgan) certainly cannot accept disjunctivism 
about phenomenal representation, for two reasons.  
First, there is the modal problem. The disjunctive relation is defined in 
terms of a list of all the experience-constituting neural states actual creatures 
undergo, and the properties they actually phenomenally represent while 
undergoing those neural states. But surely there is a possible world where 
creatures have quite different neural structures and so phenomenally represent 
“alien” perceptible properties that cannot be on this list because they do not 
exist in the actual world.19 Hence the across-worlds extension of the 
phenomenal representation relation exceeds the across-worlds extension of any 
such disjunctive or “big list” relation. It follows that the phenomenal 
representation relation is distinct from any such disjunctive relation.  
There is another problem, the indeterminacy problem. I have developed the 
problem elsewhere (Pautz 2010a, 47-48), so here I will be brief. There is 
actually a huge abundance of variant disjunctive relations that are candidates to 
be the phenomenal representation relation. They might agree in extension 
when it comes to actual humans, but differ slightly or radically when it comes 
to remote actual or possible non-humans that we never interact with. (Compare 
the plus and quus functions in Kripke’s (1982) discussion of Wittgenstein.) For 
instance, suppose that in the future we come across an alien creature (perhaps 
an alien brain in a vat). It has a complex sensory system and undergoes a 
radically different kind of neural state from us. Now one disjunctive relation, 
D, might pair its alien brain state with perceptible property P. Another, D*, 
might pair its alien brain state with another, radically different perceptible 
property, P*. Yet another might pair its alien brain state with another property, 
P**. And so on. All these arbitrary disjunctive relations exist. 
Now here is a problem for the disjunctivist. Intuitively, I can pretty easily 
refer to the phenomenal representation in my own case. And then I can go on 
to formulate various hypotheses about what the alien creature phenomenally 
represents. For instance, I might guess “the alien is aware of a shape and a 
color”. Now the disjunctivist faces the following question: are there any 
physical facts that could determine that when I make such a guess about what 
properties the creature is “aware of” (that is, phenomenally represents), I am 
determinately glomming onto one of the variant disjunctive relations of the sort 
described above, rather than any of the others? I think that disjunctivists must 
answer “No”. After all, all the variants fit my history of use of the predicate “x 
is aware of y” equally well. And it is not as if one of them stands out as being 
very natural and hence a “reference magnet” (Dorr and Hawthorne 2013). 
Rather, they are all equally unnatural and disjunctive. They are on a par. (In 
this respect, the puzzle here is unlike the puzzle about plus and quus, which 
might be solvable because plus is more natural than the other quus-like 
variants and hence a “reference magnet”.) So the disjunctivist must say that it 
is radically indeterminate what disjunctive relation it is that I’m talking 
about.20 That is to say, if disjunctivism is right, then there is no determinate 
fact of the matter about what disjunctive relation the phenomenal 
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representation relation is. But this has unacceptable results. For instance, it 
entails that I can truly say “it is indeterminate whether the alien is aware of 
(represents) spatial properties, or whether it is aware of (represents) properties 
that are nothing like spatial properties” and “it is indeterminate whether the 
alien is aware of (represents) sensible colors, or whether it instead represents 
properties belonging to a wholly alien quality-space”. Intuitively, this is 
absurd. Given that there is some necessary connection between 
phenomenology and representation, it would mean that it is radically 
indeterminate what it is like for the alien.  
These problems undermine any possible internalist reduction of the 
phenomenal representation relation. For there is no general, non-disjunctive 
algorithm, applicable to all actual and possible individuals, going from the 
intrinsic characters of those individuals’ neuro-computational states to the 
properties they phenomenally represent. So any internalist reduction of the 
phenomenal representation relation will inevitably identify it with a massively 
disjunctive relation (where there are many variant disjunctive relations in the 
vicinity, having different extensions). Consequently it will be open to the 
problems I have identified.21 Call this cluster of issues the disjunction problem. 
The conclusion I draw is that, if an internalist theory of experience such as 
the identity theory is correct, then the phenomenal representation relation is 
irreducible. This view avoids all the problems I have developed for the 
reductive position. It may seem too radical. However, as I will explain in the 
conclusion, it may not be as radical as it seems.  
My BIV argument for the irreducibility of the phenomenal representation 
relation has been entirely neutral between different solutions to the “puzzle of 
sensible properties” (§2) for internalists. Indeed, some views on this strengthen 
my case for irreducibility. For instance, given Chalmers’s general irrealist view 
(discussed in §1) that in the actual world the sensible properties and even the 
spatial properties that we phenomenally represent are entirely uninstantiated, 
we can immediately rule out the claim that the phenomenal representation 
relation is reducible to a mind-world physical-functional relation like the 
tracking relation, even before we consider BIVs. Another view is Shoemaker’s 
(1994) appearance property view, according to which (roughly) sensible 
properties are identical with properties of the form normally causing internal 
neuro-functional state F. Shoemaker only applies this view to the sensible 
properties we phenomenally represent; obviously, it wouldn’t be plausible to 
generalize it to the spatial properties we phenomenally represent. Obviously, 
even if this view is right, it does not absolve the internalist of the need to 
answer the further question: what is the dyadic phenomenal representation 
relation that BIV bears to such properties? My BIV argument for irreducibility 
of this relation applies even if Shoemaker’s view is right. For instance, even if 
Shoemaker’s view is right, the internalist cannot identify this relation with the 
tracking relation, for exactly the reasons I have given. Of course, the internalist 
might combine Chalmers’s or Shoemaker’s view about sensible properties with 
“disjunctivism” about the phenomenal representation relation. That is, he 
might identify the phenomenal representation relation with a disjunctive or 
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“big list” relation (for this theory is neutral on the metaphysical status of the 
perceptible properties that feature on that list). But we have already dismissed 
disjunctivism.  
A final point about the BIV argument. The internalist about experience 
might accept the premise of External Directedness but still try to somehow 
block my BIV argument for the irreducibility of the phenomenal representation 
relation. But let me remind the internalist what this would require. The 
internalist would have to at least gesture at a general dyadic physical-
functional relation, R, between individuals and perceptible properties (with two 
arguments places, x and y), which is a good candidate to be the dyadic 
phenomenal representation relation. In other words, he would have to gesture 
at a completion of the general schema [#]. He would also have to make it 
plausible that this relation R has the same extension as the phenomenal 
representation relation (e. g. that your BIV-duplicate bears this relation R to all 
the relevant perceptible properties, the same ones you phenomenally 
represent). Until the internalist does this, he has not provided a response. As 
Sider (117) says, if we cannot provide even a toy “metaphysical analysis” of a 
relation, we have excellent evidence that it is irreducible (or in a sense 
“fundamental” as he puts it). And the disjunction problem provides an in-
principle reason for thinking that this cannot be done in the case of the 
phenomenal representation relation.  
We have arrived at our puzzle. If the BIV argument is sound, internalism 
implies that the phenomenal representation relation is irreducible. But isn’t this 
a spooky view? Doesn’t it require that internalists give up a physicalist view of 
the mind?   
 
6. Sketch of A Possible Solution: The Internal Grounding View of 
Phenomenal Representation 
 
I think that for internalists the most reasonable response to the BIV is to accept 
its conclusion of the irreducibility of the phenomenal representation relation. 
For instance, I think that accepting this conclusion is more reasonable than 
rejecting the premise of External Directedness, since the case for that premise 
is so strong. But others may not be so sure. They will regard this conclusion as 
extremely puzzling. So in closing I would like to briefly sketch a view that 
may help to reduce our sense of puzzlement. I call it the “internal grounding 
view”. I will continue to focus on the brain-based identity theory, but other 
internalists could accept the same view. As it happens, the view meshes nicely 
with a general view of representational relations proposed by Paul Horwich 
and Stephen Schiffer on independent grounds.  
First let me introduce the notion of grounding. Recently there has been a 
lot of enthusiasm about the explanatory potential of this notion (e. g. Fine 
2001, Rosen 2010). The notion can be introduced by examples. The fact that 
John’s action was done with the sole intention of harming grounds the fact that 
it is wrong. Or again, the fact that the apple is red grounds the fact that it is 
colored. Grounding is stronger than mere necessitation or entailment: in 
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addition, grounding involves an explanatory or determinative connection. It 
also differs from reduction. For instance, as Rosen (2010) notes, followers of 
G. E. Moore might say that natural properties ground normative ones, but deny 
that natural properties are reducible to normative ones. Or again, being red 
grounds being colored, but there is no obvious reduction in the vicinity (unless 
being colored identical with a disjunction with being red as a disjunct). Many 
think that, at a minimum, physicalism about the mind requires mental 
properties and relations to be grounded in physical (and topic-neutral) ones, 
even if they may not be reducible to them.    
Now return to the tomato-like experience property R. On the identity 
theory, R is identical with neuro-computational property N. I have argued that 
identity theorists must hold that having N (on this view, R) entails 
phenomenally representing roundness. More generally, they are committed to 
the raft of the neural-representational entailments gestured at in the previous 
section. I have also argued that they must hold that the phenomenal 
representation relation is irreducible.  
Now for the internal grounding view. It only adds one claim: these neural 
states do not merely entail, but also ground, standing in the irreducible 
phenomenal representation relation to certain clusters of properties. This is in 
line with the general physicalist creed that all mental facts are grounded in 
physical facts.  
In short, I suggest that the identity theorist must accept quite different 
theories for experience properties and the associated representational 
properties. In the case of experience properties, he can retain the identity 
theory: they are identical with neural properties. Not so for the representational 
properties involved in experience. Unlike neural properties, they essentially 
have the form: standing in the irreducible phenomenal representation relation 
to spatial and other properties P, Q, R, . . . For such representational 
properties, the right model is grounding, not reduction. They are grounded in 
neural properties, but not reducible to them.  
Maybe this is a workable view. In fact, in a discussion of an earlier version 
of the present essay, Jeff Speaks has endorsed its central argument, saying that 
“the truth of [the identity theory] would have as a surprising consequence of 
the irreducibility of [the phenomenal representation relation]”; but he adds 
“this is no immediate objection to [the identity theory]” (2015, 272).  
For instance, the idea is that the monadic experience property R is identical 
with the neural property N. This property grounds, but is not identical with, the 
representational property of bearing the irreducible phenomenal representation 
relation to roundness. Likewise, the fact that two individuals (e. g. you and 
your BIV-duplicate) undergo the same monadic neural states grounds the fact 
that they bear the irreducible phenomenal representation relation to the same 
perceptible properties.  
I conclude with some comments about this view. 
(I) As I have mentioned, the internal grounding view of phenomenal 
representation accords nicely with a general theory of representation suggested 
by Horwich (1998) and Schiffer (2003, 162) and taken seriously by Field 
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(2001). On this view, representational relations (believing, meaning, etc.) are 
generally irreducible. For instance, Schiffer writes: 
 
What on earth could be the non-intentionally specifiable 
reducing relation in which “immaterial” stands to the property 
of being immaterial and by virtue of which the word means 
that property? (2003, 162) 
 
Nevertheless, Horwich and Schiffer hold that, whenever a thing (a word, an 
individual) stands in an irreducible representational relation to some item, this 
is grounded in (or “constituted by”) its having certain monadic physical 
property (a functional property, a use property, or whatever). So the view is 
still physicalist. As Field (2001, 71) puts it, according to this view, “these 
distinct monadic properties need have nothing to do with each other, and they 
certainly don't need to involve a common physical relation”.  
The internal grounding view of phenomenal representation is perfectly 
analogous. It concedes the irreducibility of the dyadic relation of phenomenal 
representation. For what on earth could be the non-intentionally specifiable 
relation in which BIV stands to the property of being round (etc.), with which 
the phenomenal representation relation might be identified? Nevertheless, the 
internal grounding view holds that, whenever an individual bears the 
irreducible dyadic phenomenal representation relation to certain perceptible 
properties, this is grounded in his being in a distinct monadic neural state 
(which is also an experiential state).  
 (II) Kit Fine has suggested a congruence constraint on grounding (2001, 
20-21). Fine’s constraint implies that if item P is real, then the ground of 
standing in a relation to P must itself involve standing in a relation to P. As 
Fine explains, this seems generally true. For instance, typically, you refer to a 
thing by virtue of standing in certain underlying (informational, etc.) relations 
to that thing. But if the internal grounding view is true, then the congruence 
constraint fails when it comes to phenomenal representation, because it holds 
that standing in the phenomenal representation relation to a shape property (for 
instance) is grounded merely in having a neural state, which is not itself a 
relation to that shape property. The Horwich-Schiffer view also violates Fine’s 
principle. They conclude that the constraint is not generally valid. Horwich 
speaks in this connection of the “constitution fallacy” (1998, 25).  
In fact, there may be other counterexamples to Fine’s congruence 
constraint. For instance, the concrete, non-relational state of an object’s having 
a certain mass grounds the relational state of its bearing the mass-in-grams 
relation to a certain number. 22 Also, the concrete, non-relational state of an 
object’s being red grounds the relational state of its instantiating the abstract 
universal, redness (Horwich 1998, 25).  
(III) The internal grounding view holds that in some cases there is a 
necessary connection between experience and representation. Yet it differs in 
several interesting ways from standard representationalist theories of 
experience (e. g. those defended by Dretske and Tye).  
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On the internal grounding view, experience grounds phenomenal 
representation. For instance, on this view, the state of having the tomato-like 
experience R is identical with the non-relational, concrete state of being in 
neural property N. This non-relational, concrete state then grounds the 
relational state of standing in the phenomenal representation relation to the 
abstract property being round. This fits with the key idea of the recently 
popular “phenomenal intentionality program” that representation is grounded 
in experience (e. g. Horgan 2014, Kriegel 2011, Mendelovici 2010). And it 
avoids the somewhat counterintuitive claim made by some representationalists 
that having an experience consists in standing in a representation relation to an 
abstract object (on the oddness of this claim see Pautz 2010c, 292ff and 
Papineau 2015, sect. 13).  
The internal grounding view also provides an internalist account of 
phenomenal representation. Since experience is internally determined and 
grounds the representation of perceptible properties, the representation of 
perceptible properties is also internally determined. This makes phenomenal 
representation unique. Our standard externalist accounts (tracking accounts, 
teleological accounts) don’t apply to it. The brain simply has an intrinsic 
capacity to phenomenally represent a certain clusters of basic perceptible 
properties (sensible colors, shapes, etc.) that need not be instantiated in the 
brain.  
The internal grounding view is also quite compatible with the anti-
representationalist idea that some experiential differences do not correspond to 
differences in the phenomenal representation of properties (Block 2007a, 538). 
For instance, maybe the difference between a blurry experience of a tomato 
and a clear one is a mere difference in the neural “content-vehicle”, one that 
doesn’t ground the phenomenal representation of any different perceptible 
properties.  
(IV) You might think that in the end the internal grounding view doesn’t 
provide totally satisfying solution to the puzzle of phenomenal representation. 
In particular, you might think it has two disadvantages.  
First, the internal grounding view appears to be more complex than the 
kind of thoroughgoing reductive physicalism defended by philosophers like 
Armstrong, Field, Jackson, Lewis, Papineau, Sider, and Smart. On reductive 
physicalism, all properties and relations of the manifest image are just identical 
with complex properties and relations built from some basic stock of properties 
and relations from the scientific image. By contrast, the internal grounding 
view holds that individuals have properties of the form standing in the 
irreducible phenomenal representation relation to so-and-so perceptible 
properties that are distinct from all such complex properties, even if they are 
grounded in some of them. So it requires that individuals have “extra” 
properties. It also appears to require extra brute principles that a thoroughgoing 
reductive physicalist position would avoid. In particular, unlike reductive 
physicalism, this view requires “grounding connections” of the following kind: 
if an individual has complex neural property N, then this grounds the distinct 
fact that this individual phenomenally represents the property of being round. 
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And, on the internal grounding view, these appear brute. For, on this view, 
what could possibly explain such grounding connections? On the internal 
grounding view, they are not derivable from a general reductive theory of the 
phenomenal representation relation (e. g. the disjunctivist or “big list” view 
that this relation is identical with a “disjunctive relation” of the kind I 
described previously), for the simple reason that this view rejects any such 
reductive theory.  Despite the recent enthusiasm for grounding, brute 
grounding connections can be objectionable in much the same way that brute 
psychophysical laws, or brute supervenience connections, are objectionable. 
My point here is not just that the internal grounding view requires an 
“explanatory gap” (something all standard physicalists have learned to live 
with); rather, the point is that this view requires extra metaphysically brute 
principles, which increases the complexity of the view.23  
Second, as a non-reductive view, the internal grounding view implies that 
there is a certain kind of non-uniformity in nature that is avoided by reductive 
physicalism. (David Lewis has raised a similar complaint against non-
reductive views of normative properties, as discussed by Jackson 1998, 27.) 
On reductive physicalism, everywhere in nature the only properties that are 
instantiated are the basic stock of properties and relations from the scientific 
image, together with complex physical-functional properties C1, C2, C3 . . . 
built up from them. But on the internal grounding view, in some cases, there is 
more to say. On this view, some of the complex physical-functional properties 
C1, C2, C3 . . . are “special” in that they ground distinct properties of the form 
standing in the irreducible phenomenal representation relation to so-and-so 
perceptible properties. So, for instance, the neural property N of the human 
brain that we have discussed in “special” in this way: it grounds the distinct 
property of phenomenally representing roundness. By contrast, the neural 
properties of the early visual system (which can be possessed in the absence of 
experience) do not ground any such distinct irreducible property. Likewise, the 
complex physical-functional properties of (say) an automobile engine do not 
ground any “extra” irreducible properties. This looks a bit arbitrary. Why do 
some complex physical-functional properties in nature (viz. certain ones of the 
brain) ground distinct irreducible properties, while others do not?  
The internal grounding view, then, appears complicated and arbitrary. 
However, I think it could be replied that this appearance is largely due to the 
fact that we lack detailed knowledge of the brain, the most complex and 
amazing thing in the world. Maybe there are general, systematic grounding 
connections between our intrinsic neural patterns and what perceptible 
properties (shapes, sensible colors, etc.) we phenomenally represent, even if 
we have not yet discovered them (Pautz 2010b; but see Adams 1987 for 
interesting grounds for skepticism). And maybe, if we only knew them 
(“cracked the neural code”), we could look into a human brain, or BIV, and 
systematically “decode” what shapes and other perceptible properties the 
subject phenomenally represents. Then the internal grounding view of 
phenomenal representation would appear much less complicated and arbitrary. 
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Some neuroscientists have recently worked on such “brain-reading” (e. g. 
Haynes 2009). But it’s still early days. 
In sum, internalists face a choice. They can either try to find a fault with 
the BIV argument, or they can accept a non-reductive view of the phenomenal 
representation relation, such as the internal grounding view. I think that their 
most reasonable option is to accept such a non-reductive view of the 
phenomenal representation relation. 24 But, again, here my primary aim has 
been to raise a puzzle for internalists about experience – not to solve it.25  
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1 I first developed this form of argument in Pautz (2010a, sect. 7) and Pautz (2013b). In those 
earlier discussions, I focused on internalism about the experience of traditional “secondary 
qualities” (sensible colors, audible qualities, and so on). In the present essay I focus instead on 
the prospects for internalism about the experience of spatial properties (“primary qualities”), a 
doctrine that I think raises unique puzzles. For further discussion of the puzzle I will be raising, 
and other puzzles for internalism about experience, see Speaks (2015).  
2 As we shall see (§3), External Directedness is much weaker than “representationalism”, the 
thesis that, necessarily, all experiential facts consist in representational facts.  
3 Various non-uniform theories are possible, but elsewhere (2010b, 353-354; 2013a, 286-288) I 
argue that they are problematic.  
4 In fact, I develop three distinct empirical arguments: the internal-dependence argument 
(Pautz 2010a, 2013a), the generalized structure argument (2006b, 2013a), and the judgment-
explanation argument (2010b, 363, n.23, 358-359). Geoff Lee has suggested in discussion that 
there are yet other arguments against tracking representationalism in particular based on the 
fact that the stimulus/signal mapping is merely probabilistic and highly context-dependent. 
5 For the hypothetical “coincidental variation cases”, see Pautz 2006a, 2010a, 2013a. These 
cases not only differ from inverted spectrum and inverted earth cases. They also differ from 
Block’s more recent cases of “shift spectrum” (2007b, section 7) and cases of “pseudonormal 
vision” (2007b, section 10). In my view, there are problems with these cases and they fail to 
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undermine tracking representationalism (Pautz 2013a, 252-254; Byrne and Hilbert 2003, 19). 
My internal dependence, illustrated with “coincidental variation cases”, avoids these problems. 
6 The recent empirical work I have cited suggests that the physical ground of phenomenal 
similarity is neuro-computational similarity. This neural-based view of phenomenal similarity 
also has the advantage of allowing that across-individual comparisons of experience make 
sense. For instance, on the neural-based view, my color experience of a tomato might resemble 
a monkey’s more than a dog’s, if our corresponding neural patterns stand in this resemblance-
order. (See also Coghill et al. 2003 and Schmidt et al. 2014 on the neural ground of across-
individual comparisons.) The only alternative to this neural-based view of phenomenal 
similarity is a behavioral-functional view according to which facts about phenomenal 
similarity, within an individual, can somehow ultimately be cashed out in terms of that 
individual’s discriminatory and other behavioral dispositions. This view has the disadvantage 
of implying that across-individual comparisons of experiences never make sense (the “Frege-
Schlick view”). True, the neural-based view requires that (i) there are well-defined measures of 
neural similarity, and (ii) that within an individual neural similarity in the relevant sense is the 
causal basis of that individual’s similarity judgments and ordering behavior. But I think these 
claims are plausible: see Pautz (2013a, n.8) and Kriegeskorte and Kievit (2013).  
7 Nevertheless, Chalmers (2012, 439) holds that when we say “the tomatoes is round” we 
speak truly, so there is also a sense in which his view is realist. For more on this, see note 13 of 
the present essay. 
8 I have said that if Chalmers’s irrealism is true, then internalism about spatial experience 
follows. It may be that we can also say that internalism about spatial experience is plausible 
only if irrealism is also true. For those who instead combine internalism with realism (e. g. 
Horgan 2014) face an explanatory challenge: if, contrary to externalist accounts, the brain 
entirely determines what properties we phenomenally represent, in a manner that is 
constitutively independent of links to the actual properties of external objects, then how come 
many of these represented properties – viz. the spatial properties and relations we 
phenomenally represent - happen to coincide with the actual properties of objects, as the realist 
says? Is this just some kind of lucky coincidence? Of course, an irrealist internalist like 
Chalmers avoids this explanatory challenge because he denies that there is such a coincidence 
to be explained: on his quite radical “Edenic” view, none of the properties we phenomenally 
represent is really out there. But for the realist internalist like Horgan (2014) there is a real 
question here. Elsewhere (2011, 418) I briefly offer a solution on behalf of the realist 
internalist, but I think it faces various problems and more needs to be said.  
9 For other empirical arguments against the externalist view that the experience of spatial 
properties can be explained in terms of tracking objective properties of objects, see Pautz 
(2011b, 394) and Masrour (2015).  
10 Block (2007a, 498) even suggests that experience may be present in an individual (like the 
patient he discusses identified as ‘GK’) in the total absence of cognitive accessibility. But it is 
a fact that many find this counterintuitive; even if the concept of phenomenal consciousness is 
not reductively analyzable in terms of cognitive accessibility, many think that there is some 
necessary connection here. Nevertheless, I think that there is a potential argument for Block’s 
suggestion based on a “naturalness-plus-use” theory of reference, together with the conjecture 
that the most natural or simple general physical property (call it ‘P’) that more or less fits our 
use of ‘experience’ across individuals is one which excludes the physical-functional machinery 
for cognitive access, so that it can be present without cognitive accessibility. In that case, 
considerations of naturalness or simplicity might support the claim that ‘experience’ refers to 
physical property P (and hence supports the identity ‘experience = physical property P’), even 
if this violates our pretheoretical intuition or opinion that there can be no experience in the 
absence of cognitive accessibility (compare Weatherson 2003 and Sider 2011, 32). Analogy: 
the most natural candidate that fits our use of ‘water’ is simply H20. A consequence is that 
water is in the air, even though we cannot detect it there (it is “inaccessible”) by ordinary 
methods and so are pretheoretically disinclined to say it is there. However, I think that my BIV 
argument is neutral on whether experience is separable from cognitive accessibility. If you 
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think experience does require cognitive accessibility, then you can assume that BIV has the 
neural machinery underlying cognitive access.  
11 In fact, Tye (2009, 196) even suggests that he has a priori justification for thinking that, if 
the physical facts were as described in the BIV scenario, then experience would be absent – in 
which case internalist theories could be swiftly ruled out from the armchair. I disagree with 
Tye’s claim, because it goes against the generally accepted point that there are simply no a 
priori links between non-experiential, physical conditions and experiential conditions (positive 
or negative). This point means that, contrary to many arguments in the philosophy of mind, 
you cannot describe a case (e. g. the BIV case, or the China-body system case) in purely 
physical, non-experiential terms, and then insist we have an a priori justification in favor of 
thinking that experience is present or absent in that case.     
12 For these options, see Tye (2000, 79) and Lycan (1996, 158). They advocate different 
versions of the idea that visual experiences have two levels of spatial content.  
13 Still, Chalmers holds that when here on Earth I say ‘tomatoes are round’, and when my twin 
on Twin Earth says ‘tomatoes are round’ (speaking of the physically different tomatoes Twin 
Earthians perceive), we both speak truly – our statements are “imperfectly veridical” (2006, 
107; 2012, 331, 439). The reason is that Chalmers thinks the occurrences ‘round’ in our 
mouths do not refer to the uninstantiated “perfect” roundness we both phenomenally represent 
(roundness-as-we-see-it) in having our identical experiences of the tomatoes. Rather, my 
Earthian term ‘roundness’ refers to the quantum-mechanical “imperfect roundness” 
instantiated by our Earthly tomatoes, whereas my twin’s term “roundness” refers to the 
different quantum-mechanical property instantiated by tomatoes on Twin Earth. (It follows 
that, on Chalmers’s view, the ordinary English term ‘round’ is Twin-Earthable.) 
14 Nevertheless, in comments on an earlier version of this paper, David Papineau (who accepts 
some form of identity theory) said that his favored response to the BIV argument I’m now 
developing for the irreducibility of phenomenal representation is to deny my initial premise of 
External Directedness, despite its strong pretheoretical pull. (Formerly, he had been more 
ambivalent about External Directedness - see Papineau 2014, 30.) However, he has recently 
suggested a replacement claim, which we might call ‘Internal Directedness’: Necessarily, if an 
individual (e. g. BIV) has tomato-like experience R (that is, on his identity theory, the intrinsic 
neural-computational property N), then there is an internal “sensory item” in the individual’s 
experience that has a certain “visual shape”, namely roundness*, where he says that 
roundness* is “an intrinsic feature of the experience” (Papineau 2016, sect. 15). Now, by a 
“sensory item”, Papineau must mean something like a population of neurons (or microchips, or 
whatever) within the individual’s head (as a physicalist, he cannot say that it is a non-physical 
sense datum). And roundness* must be something like a neuro-computational property, P, of 
this population of neurons. So Internal Directedness just amounts to the claim that, necessarily, 
if you have the tomato-like experience R, then there is an item in your head with a certain 
neural-computational property P (which Papineau somewhat misleadingly calls “roundness*” 
even though it is nothing like roundness). In my view, this falls well short of accommodating 
what is immediately plausible on reflection. What is immediately plausible on reflection is 
External Directedness: necessarily, if one has the tomato-like experience R, then one has an 
experience as of a round item of some kind, which matches the world only if some item is 
present that is round, that is, has edges roughly equidistant from a common point. Evidently, 
the property of being round, unlike the neuro-computation property P, need not be instantiated 
by one’s neural state when one has the tomato-like experience R. If External Directedness is 
false, as Papineau thinks, then why do we all agree that BIV’s experience is non-veridical, that 
is, fails to match its environment? 
15 You might think that internalists like Mendelovici and Kriegel who reject uninstantiated 
properties must reject my initial claim of External Directedness, which says that the tomato-
like experience R is necessarily directed at a round thing. For consider a different version of 
the BIV case in which the property being round is not instantiated in BIV’s environment, and 
hence (according to their anti-Platonic view of properties) does not exist in that scenario. You 
might think that R cannot be directed at a round thing in this case, if there are no round things 
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and there is not even such a property as the property of being round. But this is not obviously 
right. In fact, Mendelovici and Kriegel would accept that even in this case R is necessarily 
directed at a round thing. For they accept a “non-relational” view of the intentionality of 
experience on which it is totally neutral with respect to the existence of perceptible properties 
as well as individuals. (See also Crane 2014. However, Crane is mostly concerned to deny that 
experience is “fundamentally” a relation to propositions; he doesn’t address the issue of 
whether it necessarily involves being related to perceptible properties.) Now, as I explained in 
the text, even if they are right that having R doesn’t necessarily involve standing in the 
phenomenal representation relation to the property of being round, the second step of my 
argument (“phenomenal representation”) goes through, for External Directedness still implies 
standing in this relation to the property of being round in the cases like the BIV case where that 
property exists (see also note 17). However, for the record, I myself reject this view; I think 
that having R necessarily involves standing in the phenomenal representation relation to the 
property of being round, even in scenarios where nothing has this property. This implies the 
possibility of uninstantiated properties. For an argument for this view, and against the Kriegel-
Mendelovici view, see Pautz (2007, 525-526) and Tye (2014, 51-52).   
16 The conception of reduction requires a somewhat rich ontology of complex properties. As 
formulated, it also requires that necessary coextension is insufficient for property-identity (for 
otherwise every property would count as reducible) – but an emendation might make it 
compatible with an intensionalist theory of properties (King 1998, fn. 22). Other, less 
ontologically loaded conceptions of reduction are available: for instance, a conception 
invoking Sider’s notion of “metaphysical semantics” (2011), or one invoking the notion of a 
“real definition” (to be F is to be G).  
17 Previously, I mentioned the anti-Platonic view of Kriegel and Mendelovici that there are no 
uninstantiated properties. If an internalist goes further and accepts an extreme form of 
nominalism on which there are only individuals and there no properties at all (not even 
instantiated ones), then he will deny that External Directedness implies that BIV bears a 
“phenomenal representation” to clusters of perceptible properties in any scenario, for the 
simple reason that he thinks that there are no such things as properties. So he will dodge the 
question of how to reduce such a relation to a dyadic physical relation. However, given 
External Directedness, even the internalist who is a total nominalist must at least allow that 
BIV stands in a mind-world relation to concrete objects and scenes. For instance, if there 
happens to be a round tomato before BIV, then BIV stands in the following relation to it: 
λxλy(x has an experience that is accurate with respect to object or scene y). We might call this 
‘the veridical representation relation’ (a term suggested to me by Uriah Kriegel). The 
arguments I will employ below to argue that internalism implies the irreducibility of the 
phenomenal representation relation could be used, mutatis mutandis, to establish the 
irreducibility of this “veridical representation relation”. (For instance, he could not provide a 
“disjunctive” reduction of this relation, for reasons I’ll explain.) So, given External 
Directedness, even the internalist who is total nominalist cannot avoid irreducible 
representational relations.  
18 In response to this problem of fixing the “appropriate” population for determining 
phenomenal representation, the internalist tracking theorist might simply specify in his account 
that actual humans are always the “appropriate” population. That is, he might say that x (in this 
case, BIV) phenomenally represents property y (in this case, being round) iff x is in some 
internal state or other (in this case, N) that, in normal humans in @, tracks the instantiation of 
y. This might be called the human-centered tracking theory. But as a general account this view 
is a non-starter, for several reasons. For one thing, it’s absurdly chauvinistic to suppose that 
what perceptible properties any creature (BIV, pigeon, or whatever) phenomenally represents 
is a matter of what perceptible properties its inner states track in actual humans rather than 
some other population. Among other things, this makes facts about phenomenally 
representation totally arbitrary and insignificant. For instance, we can equally say that BIV 
“phenomenally represents” nothing but some bizarre properties involving patterns of bits, if 
we choose a possible population of brains-hooked-up-to-computers, rather than actual humans, 
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as the “appropriate” population. For another thing, when an individual phenomenally 
represents a property, then she can predicate that property of things in thought because she 
phenomenally represents it. But it would be bizarre to suppose that BIV, which occupies a 
different “possible world”, can predicate being round of things in thought because BIV is in a 
state that tracks the instantiation of roundness in humans and actual world @ (a species and a 
world that are totally remote from BIV). Finally, the human-centered tracking account has the 
mistaken implication that, if it turns out to be the case that we are all brains in vats (i. e. it is an 
illusion that there is such a natural kind as humans that we belong to), then “we sometimes 
have experiences as of round things” is false - since in that case it is false that we are in states 
that track round things in actual humans. There are yet other problems of a more technical 
nature with the kind of “actuality-based” maneuver employed by the “human-centered tracking 
theory” (Soames 1998, 15).  
19 These properties do exist in the actual world, if a version of Platonism about properties is 
true on which, necessarily, every property is such that necessarily it exists. But, needless to 
say, a cost of this solution to the modal problem would be a hyper-abundant ontology of 
uninstantiated properties.  
20 It might be the thought that the disjunctivist can say I achieve determinate reference to one 
of these disjunctive relations to the exclusion of all of the others because I think of it by means 
of the description of the one that is the phenomenal representation relation. But this response 
is obviously totally wrongheaded. For one thing, it presupposes what the disjunctivist needs to 
explain, namely, our ability to think of the phenomenal representation relation. For another, on 
disjunctivism, the phenomenal representation relation just is one of the disjunctive relations, 
which means that disjunctivists cannot sensibly accept this “by virtue of” claim. 
21 There is yet a third problem with disjunctivism. Consider again all the distinct, but very 
similar disjunctive relations I gestured at previously, whose extensions agree for humans but 
whose extensions diverge for non-human creatures. Since they are very similar to one another, 
it would be arbitrary to suppose that one of them, to the exclusion of all the others, has a 
special explanatory significance in enabling us to think about certain properties, and in 
providing immediate justification to our perceptual and introspective beliefs. Why that one? So 
disjunctivism is in tension with the common idea (mentioned in §3) that phenomenal 
representation has a unique explanatory and epistemic significance. Hawthorne 2006, pp. 108-
9 and Lee 2013 discuss a similar issue. However their point is that “significance” is in tension 
with unnaturalness, whereas my point is only that it is implausible to suppose that a relation R 
but not a relation R* has explanatory significance if R and R* are objectively very similar (a 
principle that is entirely neutral on their levels of naturalness).   
22 There is a difference between the case of measurement and the case of phenomenal 
representation. While the mass-in-grams relation admits of a reduction in measurement-
theoretic terms, the phenomenal representation relation cannot likewise be reduced. See Field 
(2001, 69-72) for the same point about representational relations more generally. 
23 Declan Smithies pointed out to me that proponent of the internal grounding view might reply 
that there is a kind of explanation of the fact that the neural property N always grounds the 
distinct property of standing in the irreducible phenomenally representation relation to being 
round. The explanation is simply that it “lies in the essence” of the neural property N that it 
always grounds the distinct property of standing in the irreducible phenomenally 
representation relation to being round. This fits with the idea that all modal facts derive from 
essence (see Rosen 2010 for discussion). However, in my view, this non-reductive view 
doesn’t make any real progress in reducing complexity because it simply replaces brute 
grounding connections with brute essentialist connections between distinct properties. In fact, 
it is no less complicated than the initial internal grounding view. It also has the drawback of 
non-uniformity: it requires “special” essentialist connections concerning phenomenal 
representation of a kind we do not encounter elsewhere in nature. As I am about to explain in 
the text, non-uniformity is a drawback of any non-reductive view.    
24 I should say that, while I think that certain internalists (viz. identity theorists) ought to accept 
the “internal grounding view” of phenomenal representation that I have described, I do not 
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myself accept all elements of that view. (For one thing, I am skeptical about physicalism.) But 
I do accept a non-reductive, internalist view of phenomenal representation along broadly the 
same lines (Pautz 2010a, 2010b). David Chalmers (2006, pp. 83-84; 2012, pp. 342-344) 
accepts such a view as well, although his arguments are more a priori than mine (Pautz 
2013b).  
25 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at Oxford University, the University of 
Southern California, and Brown University. I thank the audiences on those occasions for very 
helpful discussions. I would also like to thank Brian Cutter, Uriah Kriegel, Angela 
Mendelovici, David Papineau, Jeff Speaks, and Daniel Stoljar for helpful comments or 
discussion. Finally, I am conscious of a considerable philosophical debt to Ned Block, which I 
hope is evident in these pages.   
